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Abstract
To study potential limitations of controllability of physical systems I have earlier proposed physically
universal cellular automata and Hamiltonians. These are translation invariant interactions for which any
control operation on a finite target region can be implemented by the autonomous time evolution if the
complement of the target region is ‘programmed’ to an appropriate initial state. This provides a model
of control where the cut between a system and its controller can be consistently shifted, in analogy to the
Heisenberg cut defining the boundary between a quantum system and its measurement device. However,
in the known physically universal CAs the implementation of microscopic transformations requires to
write the ‘program’ into microscopic degrees of freedom, while human actions take place on the macro-
scopic level. I therefore ask whether there exist physically universal interactions for which any desired
operation on a target region can be performed by only controlling the macroscopic state of its surround-
ing. A very simple argument shows that this is impossible with respect to the notion of ‘macroscopic’
proposed here: control devices whose position is only specified up to ‘macroscopic precision’ cannot
operate at a precise location in space. This suggests that reasonable notions of ‘universal controllability’
need to be tailored to the manipulation of relative coordinates, but it is not obvious how to do this. The
statement that any microscopic transformation can be implemented in principle, whenever it is true in
any sense, it does not seem to be true in its most obvious sense.
1 Motivation
During the past decades significant progress has been made regarding the ability of controlling elemen-
tary quantum systems [1]. Experiments that are meanwhile feasible include manipulating single trapped
ions [2] and also preparing coherent superpositions, interference experiments with large atoms [3], or
controlling interacting spins in nuclear magnetic resonance [4], just to mention a few examples. These
success stories raise a variety of fundamental questions:
Is any unitary operation feasible? In standard quantum mechanics textbooks, skeptical remarks
about whether any unitary on arbitrary system Hilbert spaces can be implemented in reality, are rare.
Indeed, in the context of quantum computing [1], researchers have studied a broad variety of quantum
systems for which any unitary can be approximated by concatenating elementary transformations [5]
whose implementation has been demonstrated. At first glance, it seems that the question of feasibility of
an arbitrary unitary thus reduces to complexity theoretic issues – which would amount to fundamental
limitations ‘only’ after accounting for finiteness of time resources, e.g., due to the potential finite life
time of the universe. The feasibility of complex transformations, however, could even be restricted if
infinite implementation time is allowed, namely if every elementary unitary can only be implemented up
to some tiny error accuracy. Contrary to a common belief, tiny errors do matter for this question despite
the existence of error correcting codes [6]. This is because error correcting codes only ensure the ability
to implement any unitary on the logical space, while a large part of the physical state space cannot be
reached. This will be briefly explained in the following paragraph.
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Emergence of a classical world The contrast between quantum theory and our every day life being
governed by classical laws, has been subject of debates since the early days of quantum mechanics, see
e.g. [7, 8] and references therein. After recent results on the foundations of quantum theory [9] have
provided a more profound understanding about which phenomena are genuinely quantum and which
ones can also be understood classically [10], it may be recommended to reconsider the emergence of
a classical world with more conceptual clarity. Assuming that any formally possible measurement and
unitary can be implemented in principle implies the measurability of observables that are incompatible
with observables that are believed to be classical, which challenges the existence of a classical world and
the irreversibility of the measurement process.
To explain possible limitations for the implementation of arbitrary macroscopic superpositions, we
consider a class of observables that are good candidates for being particularly ‘classical’. To this end,
consider a system that consists of n qubits, just to have a simple example. For any self-adjoint operator
a acting on C2, let
aj := 1⊗ · · · ⊗ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−1
⊗a⊗ 1⊗ · · · ⊗ 1
be its copy acting on qubit j. Then we define the mean field observable
a :=
1
n
∑
j=1
aj . (1)
For instance, σz in a spin chain, would be the average spin in z-direction, an observable that is for
large n directly accessible to human experience via its magnetization. The observables σx, σy, σz can
be approximately measured simulatenously since they almost commute [11], suggesting to consider the
vector (σx, σy, σz) as the classical magnetization. Yet, this view is problematic if one assumes that the
‘Schro¨dinger cat state’
ψ :=
1√
2
(|0 · · · 0〉+ |1 · · · 1〉) (2)
can be prepared. Here, we have assumed that we are able to measure the observables that distinguish
(2) from the mixture of |0 · · · 0〉 and |1 · · · 1〉 (otherwise it would be unclear how to define the difference
between coherent superposition and mixture anyway unless one commits to an ontic interpretation of the
wave function). To discuss possible limitations for preparing states like (2), note that [12] has shown
the following impossibility result: whenever one starts in a product state and the preparation procedure
relies on one- and two-qubit gates which are imprecise in the sense that they are slightly depolarizing
(i.e., each gate outputs the maximally mixed state with some tiny probability ), states like (2) cannot
be approximated in principle. If one believes that  can get arbitrarily close to zero when technology
advances, the results in [12] do not imply any fundamental restrictions. However, theoretical results sug-
gest fundamental lower bounds on the error rates that are based on the quantumness of the controllers,
for instance, due to the finiteness of the clocking devices [13]. Until we understand how the interface
between our classical actions and microscopic degrees of freedom really works, we cannot decide the po-
tential limitations to controllability. Although these remarks are speculative, they nevertheless motivate
the construction of models of control within which potential limitations can be derived.
Emergence of accuracy Regardless of the precision that is achieved by modern control technology,
any human action on the microscopic world is finally performed by macroscopic actions on devices that
are large enough to be grasped with our hands. Remarkably, the inaccuracy that is inherent to any motion
of our hands, is not necessarily inherited by the control operation (for instance, if the tip of an scanning
tunneling microscope is moved on the scale of single atoms). In other words, we are able to precisely
control tiny objects by imprecisely moving macroscopic objects, raising the question how this accuracy
‘emerges’.1
There is also another kind of ‘emergence of accuracy’ in time that is given by technological evolution,
see Figure 12. While handaxes from the stone age would not have been appropriate to precisely control
tiny quantum systems, those stone age tools have obviously been powerful enough to produce more
precise tools, which, in turn, were able to produce even more precise ones. It sounds paradox that a tool
can be more precise than the tool it has been manufactured by, but obviously this is possible. Since it
1See also the debate about limitations of future nanotechnology and whether one will ever produce nanorobots that reproduce
themselves [14]. The problem of controlling tiny things like atoms with ‘fat and sticky’ fingers is already mentioned there.
2Images taken from Wikipedia, authors (from left to right): (1) Theroadislong, (2) unspecified (3) Glenn McKechnie, (4) Mnolf.
Resdistribution only under licenses described there (keywords: ‘handaxe’, ‘Hammer’, ‘Drehmaschine’, ‘ion trap’).
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Figure 1: Sketch of the evolution of precision in technological evolution, from the left to the right: Hand-
axe, Hammer, turning machine, ion trap. Humans used primitive tools to produce tools with increasing
precision. Obviously, the tools do not necessarily inherit the inaccuracy from the tools that have been used
for producing them.
seems that such a process involves a large number of steps in between (one couldn’t have produced the
ion trap directly by an handaxe), one can speculate that operating on microscopic degrees of freedoms by
acting on macroscopic ones involves some logical depth in the computational model provided below.3
These remarks are, again, quite vague and only supposed to motivate models of controllers for mi-
croscopic systems that explain ‘emergence of accuracy’ in the sense that microscopic degrees of freedom
can be accessed by operating on macroscopic ones.
Structure of the paper Subsection 2.1 sketches the notion of physically universal CAs and Hamil-
tonians introduced in [16] and explains in what sense they can be seen as a toy model for a world in
which every physical degree of freedom is indirectly accessible by operating on the remaining degrees
of freedom. Subsection 2.2 shows that it is impossible to control any microscopic degree of freedom by
only specifying the ‘macroscopic’ properties of the regions surrounding the target region. The fact that
it is in fact feasible to control microscopic degrees of freedoms by human actions that operate on the
macroscopic scale suggests that universal controllability can only hold in a weaker sense.
2 Universal controllers with macroscopic interface
2.1 Physical universality
I first introduce the concept of physical universality as introduced in [16] and explain what qualifies
physically universal CAs and Hamiltonians for studying how to control physical degree of freedoms.
This point can be made without being overly formal.
Classical CAs A classical cellular automaton in dimension d consists of cells corresponding to points
in the lattice Λ := Zd, each cell can attain values in some finite alphabet Σ. The discrete dynamics α
is given by some local translational invariant update rule that is repeated in every time step. Before we
explain physical universality, we restrict the attention to reversible CAs, since this condition is necessary
for physical universality as observed by Schaeffer [17]. The simplest way to ensure reversibility is given
by so-called Margolus neighborhoods [18]. This is an update scheme consisting of two update rules for
odd and even time steps, respectively. In two dimensions, for instance, one update rule is a transformation
acting on each square
Si,jeven := ((2i, 2j), (2i+ 1, 2j), (2i, 2j + 1), (2i+ 1, 2j + 1)) i, j ∈ Z,
while the other one acts on the square
Si,jodd := ((2i− 1, 2j − 1), (2i, 2j − 1), (2i− 1, 2j), (2i, 2j)) i, j ∈ Z.
In the even and odd time step, the update rules permute the configurations in ΣS
i,j
even and ΣS
i,j
odd , respec-
tively. This resulting update rule α then is a bijection of configurations in ΣΛ. The overall update rule
defines the autonomous time evolution of the system.
3The idea that intuitive notions of complexity of physics are associated with logical depth can already be found in [15].
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We now define what it means that this time evolution ‘implements’ some desired transformation. For
any finite regionR ⊂ Λ let β : ΣR → ΣR be a map on the possible configurations ofR. A configuration
c ∈ ΣΛ\R of the remaining part of the lattice is said to implement f after time t ∈ N if
αt ((c, r)) |R = β(r),
for every configuration r ∈ ΣR, with |R denoting the restriction of the output configuration to R. Here
(c, r) denotes the configuration of the entire lattice defined by the restrictions c and r to Λ \ R and R,
respectively. The CA is said to be physically universal if there is a configuration of Λ \R implementing
f for any function f and any finite region R. Meanwhile, a physically universal classical CA for d = 2
has been constructed by Schaeffer [17], and for d = 1 by Salo & To¨rma¨ [19].
Quantum CAs The natural analog of the classical CA above is a lattice whose cells contain the
Hilbert space C|Σ|, with basis vectors labelled by the alphabet Σ. The observable algebra of a single cell
is given by M(C|Σ|). To avoid issues of infinite tensor products of Hilbert spaces, mathematical physics
uses an algebraic framework that I briefly mention for sake of completeness, although its details are not
important for the problems discussed here. Readers who are not familiar with this framework may also
skip these details and think of a state of the infinite lattice simply as a family of density matrices for finite
regions whose restrictions to common subsets of cells are consistent.
For any finite region R, the observable algebra AR is given by the tensor product of |R| copies of
M(C|Σ|), with the canonical embedding that considers AR as subalgebra of AR′ for R ⊂ R′. Then the
algebraAΛ of the entire CA is given by the C∗-inductive limit of these algebrasAR [20], also called the
quasi-local algebra [21]. It is given by the completion of the union ∪RAR over all finite regions R with
respect to the operator norm. A state ρ is no longer be given by a vector or a density operator – since we
are not talking about the Hilbert space of the infinite system, but only about the algebra of observables.
Instead, it is given by a linear positive functional ρ : AΛ → R of norm 1 [22]. With any (not necessarily)
finite subset S ⊂ Λ we can then associate a C∗-subalgebraAS ofAΛ generated by subalgebras of finite
regions in S.
Reversible update rules are, again, most easily constructed using Margolus neighborhoods, where
independent unitaries act on each of the above quadruples of cells. They define C∗-automorphisms
[22, 21] for each A
S
i,j
even
and A
S
i,j
odd
, respectively, which results in an C∗-algebra automorphism of AΛ.
Its dual is a map on the states of AΛ that we also call α (like the update rule in the classical CA). This
overloading of notation will be convenient if we later talk about the behaviour of α in cases where we
do not need to distinguish between the quantum and the classical case. The state ρ of AΛ\R is said to
implement the unitary u ∈ AR up to the accuracy  whenever
‖α(ρ⊗ γ)|R − uγu†‖1 ≤ ,
for any state γ on AR. We call a state ρ a ‘basis state’ whenever its restriction to any finite region R is
given by
ρ|R(b) = 〈ψ, b ψ〉,
with ψ being a tensor product of single cell basis states:
|ψ〉 := ⊗λ∈R|sλ〉,
with sλ ∈ Σ. A quantum CA is called physically universal if for any finite target region T ⊂ Λ of cells,
and any unitary u ∈ AT , there is a basis state ρ ofAΛ\T and a time t ∈ N such that the t-fold application
of the update rule α implements u for any desired accuracy . A physically universal quantum CA for
d = 2 has been constructed by Schaeffer [23].
Replacing the CA with a Hamiltonians To get closer to physics, one may want to replace the
discrete time evolution by a fixed translational invariant Hamiltonian thus resembling the usual notion
of spin chains [24]. Then the time evolution is a group (αt)t∈R of C∗-automorphisms obtained by the
limit of automorphisms induced by Hamiltonians HR that act on finite regions only, a construction that
is standard for describing the dynamics of infinite spin chains in mathematical physics [25].
Below we will only use the discrete setting for sake of its simplicity. After all, discrete update rules
close to the identity can approximate the Hamiltonian evolution anyway, which shows that the discrete
idealization is not too far from physics.
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Why studying physical universality? To explain why known constructions of CAs [26] are not
sufficient for our purpose, note that they admit universal control on the data cells only, with the program
being written into distinct program cells. This distinction is not allowed if one also wants to understand
how to manipulate the data cells. In other words, a model of controlling microphysics should not only
be computationally universal in the sense of being able to act universality one some logical subspace.
Instead, it is supposed to act universally on the entire physical space.4 The following thoughts exper-
iment may justify physical universality even further. Assume we believe that any physical degree of
freedom is controllable, that is, there are human actions on some control devices that ensure that the
desired operation is performed on the target system. It should then be possible to build a technical de-
vice that replaces the human and implements the actions on the control device automatically. This setup
would involve some robot-like actors replacing the motion of human hands, plus some computing device
replacing the human cognitive process required to properly act on the control device (including a correct
timing of those actions). We now consider an ‘overall’ device consisting of all these devices together.
The dynamics of the overall device is given by some fixed interaction of the physical particles it consists
of. If our CA is supposed to be a toy model of the world –in which presence and absence of matter
is described by appropriate states of an a priori homogeneous space– both building the hardware of the
controlling device, and programming its program register, just amounts to writing a program into the
CA. These arguments suggest to use physically universal interactions as models, given that we belief that
every formally possible control operation can be performed by humans.5
2.2 The problem of specifying only macroscopic properties
For some finite target region T and a desired transformation β : ΣT → ΣT we want to initialize Λ \ T
in such a way that β is implemented after some time t ∈ N, but we demand that only the ‘macroscopic’
properties of some initial configuration c ∈ ΣΛ should matter. Due to the locality of update rules in CAs,
only a finite region R surrounding T is relevant for the implementation anyway. We therefore need to
describe the ‘macroscopic’ properties only for the restriction cR of c to R. To this end, we partition R
into the disjoint union of m regions R = R1 ∪ R2 ∪ · · · ∪Rm as shown in Figure 2. One may think of
these regions as representing pieces of matter made of different material.
2.3 Classical CA
Motivated by macroscopic observables like ‘mean magnetization’, let us specify the macroscopic state
of any region Rj as follows. For each s1, . . . , sk ∈ Σ, let N j1 (cR), . . . , N jk(cR) denote the numbers of
occurences of symbols in Rj . Then define the corresponding densities via the normalization nii(cR) :=
N ji (cR)/|Rj |. As sufficient condition for cR to implement β, we assume
|nij(cR)− lij | ≤ , (3)
where  is some error tolerance. If we think of the regions Rj to consist of a macroscopic number of
cells (order of 1023 like Avogadro’s constant, for instance),  is thought to be much closer to 1 than to
the inverse of this huge number – otherwise we would not call the deviation ‘macroscopic’.
Let us now consider a configuration c′R that satisfies our macroscopic constraints (3) better than
required, that is, with /2 instead of . We then consider the configuration c′′R = τ(c
′
R), where τ
denotes the right shift by one cell. Whenever the regions Rj are large enough to ensure that the overlap
τ(Rj)∩Rj covers more than the fraction 1− /2 of Rj , the densities cannot change by more than /2.
Thus, c′′R still satisfies (3), which guarantees that it also implements β. Assume now that T consists of
the two adjacent cells (0, 0, · · · , 0) and (1, 0, . . . , 0). Further assume that it acts a NOT on the first cell
and the identity on the second one. However, if c′R implements β, translation invariance of the update
rules imply that c′′R implements τ ◦ β ◦ τ−1. Hence, c′′R implements a NOT on (1, 0, . . . , 0) although
we have argued that it implements ID on that cell, as c′R does. We phrase this simple observation as a
theorem:
Theorem 1 (no classical physically universal CA with macroscopic interface) Given a CA with di-
mension d ∈ N. Assume we describe the macroscopic state of the complement of T by densities of
4For possible thermodynamic consequences of this strong notion of universality see [27].
5For other notions of universality, e.g., those that refer to the ability of a machine to reproduce itself, see also von Neumann’s
universal constructor [28], cp. also constructor theory by Deutsch et al. [29].
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Figure 2: Different regions Rj surrounding the target region T . We describe the macroscopic state of the
surrounding of T by specifying the fraction of occurrences of each symbol in Σ for each Rj .
symbols in some regions Rj for which
rj :=
|τ(Rj) ∩Rj | − |Rj |
|Rj | ≤ /2.
Then there cannot be constants lij such that every initialization satisfying (3) implements the operation
(NOT,ID) on the cells (0, 0, · · · , 0) and (1, 0, · · · , 0).
Although our specific notion of ‘macroscopic’ may not necessarily be the right one for our purpose,
our conclusion seems to be quite robust regarding reasonable redefinitions. Specifying the initial state in a
way that is insensitive to shifting it by a few cells (which should be true for any macroscopic description),
cannot implement any precisely localized operation. In the terminology of [30, 31], it is impossible to
generate reference information from zero, a notion that has meanwhile been defined within a quite general
framework of resource theories.6
Since the above shift operation can be seen as a translation of hardware of the entire control device,
it is obvious that it simply shifts the target operation. Rather than demanding a target operation whose
action is specified by an absolute position in space, it thus seems more appropriate to define a target
region relative to the position of the control device (in analogy to a relational formulation of quantum
theory [33] in which only relative coordinates are accessible). The way to get out of this problem,
however, is not as obvious as it seems. After all, no description of the hardware of a realistic control
device would be precise enough to admit an obvious definition of its ‘location in space’ up to the scale
of single cells (which would be required for defining the relative position of the target region). To see
this, think of variations of a hardware where the shapes of the regions Rj differ on the scale of single
cells. In some cases, it could be that only the position of the barycenter of one specific Rj matters for
the position of the target operation. In others, it could be the barycenter over all regions, or also more
sophisticated functions of the shape. To further elaborate on the idea that there is no obvious definition
of relative position, think of the case where some regions Rj are shifted by one cell, others remain fixed,
and the remaining regions slightly change their shape to yield a valid partition. What is the ‘position’ of
the new device relative to the orginal one? Does it differ by one cell or not?
6[32], for instance, introduces a quasi-order of clocks in which no time covariant operation can generate a clock that is more
precise than the ‘resource’ clock.
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2.4 Quantum CA
We will see that there is nothing substantially different for an analog argument for the quantum CA,
although some steps need to be modified. For an analog definition of ‘densities’ on the regions Rj we
use the mean-field observables of the type (1): For any observable a ∈ M(C|Σ|) with ‖a‖ ≤ 1 we
denote its copy on site λ ∈ Λ by aλ and then define the mean field observable for any region R by
aR :=
1
|R|
∑
λ∈R
aλ.
While macroscopic observables in mathematical physics are usually defined via limits of averages of
infinitely growing regions [25], we want to explicitly stay ways from these ‘tricks’. This would be an
idealization that could not provide convincing arguments for fundamental limits.
For a state ρ to implement our target operation β we assume that all these mean field observables
should attain values that are close to laj up to a small deviation only. We therefore require
ρ
[
(aRj − laj 1)2
] ≤ , (4)
with 1 denoting the identity in AΛ and laj some constants in [−1, 1]. Note that different mean field
observables on the same region R commute up to an error term of operator norm O(1/|R|), which is
easily seen by straightforward counting of terms. For large regions, they are thus almost compatible.
For product states, for instance, all mean field observables have uncertainty of the order O(1/
√|R|).
Therefore, it is for sufficiently large R, feasible to specify the values of all mean-field observables by
constraints like (4) with appropriate values laj .
Introducing the shift τ∗ on AΛ simple counting arguments show
‖τ∗(aRj )− aRj‖ ≤ rj ,
with rj as in Theorem 2. Hence,
‖τ∗ ((aRj − laj 1)2)− (aRj − laj 1)2‖ ≤ 2rj .
Whenever we ensure that ρ satisfies the bound (4) with /2 instead of  and we ensure that the regionsRj
are large enough to satisfy 2rj ≤ /2, we thus know that τ(ρ) still implements the same transformation
as ρ. Finally, we obtain the following result – which comes without any surprises:
Theorem 2 (no physically universal quantum CA with macroscopic interface) Whenever the regions
Rj satisfy rj ≤ /4, it is not possible that all states ρwhose mean field observables satisfy the constraints
(4) implement (NOT,ID) on the cells (0, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 0, · · · , 0).
3 Conclusions
Within our highly idealized model class, we have shown that microscopic actions cannot be achieved by
controlling only the macroscopic state of the controller. We conclude that physically universal CAs only
admit universal control of microscopic degrees of freedom if one is able to act on the microscopic degrees
of freedom of the controller. In the strict sense of physical universality defined previously, macroscopic
control of the controller is thus insufficient to achieve universality. We have argued that it is necessary
to rephrase universality in a sense that accounts for the absence of an absolute spatial reference systems,
but it is not obvious how to achieve this. The right class of models that describes how humans are able to
act on microscopic systems by changing the state of macroscopic control devices by hand thus remains
to be found.
Understanding this may help deciding whether any unitary can be implemented or whether there
are fundamental limitations for many-particle systems. Even if such a theory of the interface predicted
the limitations that all elementary unitaries can only be implemented with some tiny inaccuracies, this
could have dramatic implications for the appearance of a classical world. [12], for instance, showed
that macroscopic superpositions can no longer attained7. The idea that a classical world emerges from
decoherence is certainly standard. This insight would obtain, however, an even more fundamental signif-
icance if one could show a universal microscopic theory of the controlling interface itself entails limits
of controllability.
7This result is not challenged by the existence of error correcting codes since we care about physical states and not logical states
that are embedded into a larger system.
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